










VIRTUE, AND VIOLENCE IN THERAVĀDA AND 
SRI LANKAN BUDDHISM 
 




The English word ethics stems from the Greek word “ethos” 
that signifies a way of life or art of living. Ethics concerns human 
actions, behaviors, and practices, in particular how we ought to 
treat others and ourselves. In the western philosophical tradition, to 
speak schematically, there are two major forms of approaching 
ethics. On the one hand, one form of ethical theory consists of the 
rule based on ethics found in the deontological ethics of intention 
and duty, and the other the utilitarian ethics of evaluating actions in 
terms of their consequences. Virtue ethics and other varieties of 
context-based ethics, on the other hand, emphasize the individual 
and communal cultivation of virtues through role models and 
exemplars and their appropriate and flexible application to the 
situation. The ethical is not assessed by the intentions and 
consequences of actions but by how these and other elements fit 
into a concrete way of life as a whole. 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Ronald Green for his comments and suggestions for 
improving the argument and style of this paper. I am also thankful to Namita 
Goswami and Lori Witthaus for their thoughts on an earlier draft presented at 
the Association for Asian Studies. This early short version appeared as “Virtue, 
Violence, and Engagement in Theravāda and Sri Lankan Buddhism,” SACP 
Forum for Asian and Comparative Philosophy 23.47 (Fall 2006): 192-216. 




Recent scholarship, in particular Damien Keown’s pioneering 
works on Buddhist ethics, has seen the development of the claim 
that Buddhist ethics is a variety of “virtue ethics.” 2  That is, 
according to Keown, “Buddhist ethics is aretetic: it rests upon the 
cultivation of personal virtue in the expectation that as spiritual 
capacity expands towards the goal of enlightenment ethical choices 
will become clear and unproblematic.” 3  Virtue ethics is a 
contemporary approach to morality that resorts to the moral 
paradigm developed by Aristotle. Aristotelian ethics emphasizes 
the cultivation of individual virtues and the political community in 
order to promote human flourishing or happiness in the broadest 
sense. Keown argues for an interpretation of Buddhist ethics 
“based on the Aristotelian model, or at least one understanding of 
it.” Keown continues, “The parallel between Buddhist and 
Aristotelian ethics is, I believe, quite close in many respects. 
Aristotle’s ethical theory appears to be the closest Western 
analogue to Buddhist ethics, and is an illuminating guide to an 
understanding of the Buddhist moral system.”4 
In this paper, I will examine the role of virtue ethics and 
violence in traditional Theravāda and contemporary Sri Lankan 
Buddhism. Despite the limits and problems of applying the virtue 
ethics model – especially in its Aristotelian form advocated by 
Keown – to Buddhist ethics, I contend that the virtue ethical 
elements of Theravāda Buddhism help clarify issues of war and 
violence as well as compassion and peace in a country such as Sri 
Lanka (the former British colony of Ceylon). The Sri Lankan 
people, both Sinhalese and Tamil, have suffered from 
approximately three decades of civil war, ethnic strife, and 
terrorism. An end to this conflict between the mostly Buddhist 
Sinhalese and predominantly Hindu Tamils is still not in sight. 
The issues revealed by the relation between Buddhism, politics, 
and violence in South Asia should serve as a caution to and a 
                                                 
2 Damien Keown, Buddhist Ethics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 25; and The Nature of Buddhist Ethics 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 2. 
3 Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, 2. 
4 Ibid, 21. 





source of self-reflection for the contemporary project of socially 
engaged Buddhism. Given (1) the everyday logic of being 
absorbed in circumstances and making exceptions for one’s own 
actions and inactions; (2) the possibility of acting from the 
condition of exception and emergency (as being the norm and the 
typical rather than the extraordinary and atypical); and (3) the 
customary division between friend and enemy, native and foreign, 
ethical and social norms and practices can be used to reproduce 
and intensify rather than dismantle and resolve social conflicts. 
This is true even of an ethics that is well-intentioned and altruistic, 
such as perhaps the canonical Theravāda ethics of loving kindness 
(mettā), generosity (dāna), and compassion (karuā), if it obeys 
instead of confronting this logic of conflict. 
Consequently, despite the many merits of the recent revival of 
the ethical and religious in contemporary thought and culture, the 
related privatization of social-political issues into private ones of 
charity and compassion can result in an ideological blindness to 
and a perilous one-sidedness in addressing issues of social justice. 
That is, the ethical requires an understanding of and concern with 
society beyond individual attitudes, intentions, and virtues if it is 
not to become an unethical and abstract cult of virtue or misused in 
the name of various particular religious, moral, national, and ethnic 
identities. To this extent, ethics in general and in Buddhism needs 
to be more than the virtue ethics of individuals and communities, 
i.e., more than an ethics of individual and social virtues in order to 
be both open and responsive to encountering others as well as 
critical of its own self-distortion, if ethics is a response to rather 
than an excuse for the underlying logic of conflict, violence, and 
war that so often dominate human relations. 
 




2. Buddhism and Virtue Ethics 
 
Morality, meditation, and wisdom constitute the three-fold 
basis of Theravāda Buddhist practice. As the foundation and 
prerequisite of the path, the moral life (sīla) is the first part of 
Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa’s great commentary Visuddhimagga 
and it is described by the Buddha as the foundation on which the 
path is built.5 Theravāda Buddhist ethics is considered a variety of 
virtue ethics, which considers the effects actions have on one’s 
general condition or way of life as a whole, because it emphasizes: 
(1) morality (sīla) as a way of life rather than a system of rules, (2) 
the cultivation of morality through precepts and as perfections and 
virtues, (3) moral psychology, which is richly developed in the Pāli 
suttas and commentaries, and (4) the need for skillfulness, 
fittingness, and appropriateness in applying morality to the 
situation.6 Although Theravāda ethics differs from the Aristotelian 
paradigm of virtue ethics, such as its focus on the actual and 
concrete suffering of the other and of all sentient beings, it remains 
comparable in some ways to Aristotelian and Confucian ethics in 
stressing the need for the cultivation of an apt ethical discernment 
that is responsive to the context through the appropriate enactment 
of morality. 
There are aspects of the Pāli canon that clearly evoke 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, as when the Buddha described the moral 
life constitutive of the Buddhist path as a “noble aggregation of 
                                                 
5 Bhadantācariya Buddhaghoa, The Path of Purification, tr. Bhikkhu 
Ñāamoli (Seattle: Buddhist Publication Society Pariyatti Editions, 1999); and 
Numerical Discourses of the Buddha, tr. and ed. Nyanaponika Thera and 
Bhikkhu Bodhi (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2000) is a selective translation 
of the Aguttara-nikāya (hereafter cited as AN), AN XI.1, AN XI.2. 
6 The view that Mahāyāna involves a kind of virtue ethic has been more 
extensively developed, especially given the claim that the Bodhisattva’s 
compassion can override rules. Arguments for Zen and Mahāyāna virtue ethics 
are found in Simon P. James, Zen Buddhism and Environmental Ethics 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) and David E. Cooper and Simon P. James, 
Buddhism, Virtue and Environment (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). 





virtues” involving a “faultless happiness.” 7  Here we see an 
emphasis on the cultivation of virtues, their complementary unity 
in producing a balanced way of life, and the happiness that this 
entails. For the Buddha, the self-interested concern for one’s own 
welfare leads one to develop a goodness that involves its own kind 
of well-being. 8  Likewise, the Buddha’s emphasis on moral 
appropriateness instead of ethical absolutes and skillfulness in 
relation to the situation and context is a characteristic of virtue 
ethics. Nevertheless, Keown’s argument for the parallel between 
Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics is problematic given that 
Aristotle’s phronesis (prudential judgment or sense of 
appropriateness) is primarily an aristocratic mastery, an 
accomplishment of the patriarchal householder and active citizen, 
whereas Buddhist moral skillfulness (Pāli: kusala) transcends the 
ekos and polis to a kind of freedom in relation to people and 
things.9 This is not the freedom of indifference but of compassion 
(karunā, the core virtue) as a spontaneous responsiveness 
constituted by instead of transcending the ethical. Such freedom 
evokes one aspect of a different variety of ancient Greco-Roman 
virtue ethics – the cosmopolitanism of the Greco-Roman Cynics 
and Stoics. Rather than restricting the ethical to the polis, the 
political community, the Hellenistic and Roman Cynics and Stoics 
argued for the moral community of humanity, advocating a 
universal rather than particularistic “virtue ethics.”10 Likewise in 
Buddhism, the ethical is not limited to the national community or 
even the human, as ethical responsiveness extends to all sentient 
beings and to the world itself. This suggests a kind of Buddhist 
                                                 
7 MN I. 269; translation in John J. Holder, ed. and tr., Early Buddhist 
Discourses (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006), 70. 
8 SN III.4. Most passages cited from SN can be found in the following 
incomplete translation: The Sutta-Nipata, tr. H. Saddhatissa (Surrey: Curzon, 
1994). 
9 Keown, op. cit., ch.8. 
10 Martha Nussbaum criticizes the reduction of virtue ethics to the 
communitarian model of Aristotelian ethics, contending that Stoicism offers a 
more humanistic and universalistic model in “Kant and Cosmopolitanism,” in 
James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, eds., Perpetual Peace: Essays on 
Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 46. 




world-community (cosmo-polis), which is further supported in the 
ideal of the cakkavatti as a universal and inclusive wheel-turning 
monarch. The wheel-turning monarch conquers through law rather 
than violence (“stick or sword”), instituting peace and fairness for 
all.11 
Whereas appropriateness is secondary to principle in rule-
based ethics and to command and law in the legalism of command 
theory, virtue and context-oriented ethics is defined by the 
recognition that appropriateness is not accidental but constitutive 
of the ethical. Ethical life calls for the development of moral 
sensibility or judgment, since the richness and complexity of life 
cannot be adequately articulated and addressed through an abstract 
system of mechanical rules or rigid commands. Some might object 
that Buddhism has no ethics but only calls for a non-moral 
meditative insight into the causality of karma. This view of karmic 
determinism is clearly false, as I have argued in more detail 
elsewhere. 12  For the Buddha, as he is said to state repeatedly 
throughout the Sutta-nipāta, the path is intrinsically ethical 
although morality alone is insufficient for liberation.13 Buddhism is 
about deeds rather than rules and rites. 14  One should focus on 
moral conduct, virtue and responsibility instead of the fate or 
destiny of caste or birth;15 since there is no shelter except the actual 
good we have done.16 
Given that family resemblances and analogies do not entail 
identity, it is important to resist conflating Buddhist with other 
varieties of virtue ethics such as Aristotle’s. This context-sensitive 
and flexible responsiveness articulated in Buddhism is not based in 
political prudence, interpreted as discriminatory judgment, and the 
                                                 
11 DN I.89, DN III.59. Dīgha Nikāya, translation available in The Long 
Discourses of the Buddha, tr. Maurice Walshe (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 
1995). 
12 E. S. Nelson, “Questioning Karma: Buddhism and the Phenomenology of 
the Ethical,” in Charles Prebish, Damien Keown, and Dale S. Wright, 
Revisioning Karma (Journal of Buddhist Ethics 14 (2007)): 353-373. 
13 SN IV.898. 
14 SN II. 249-250. 
15 SN I. 136-140, III. 462, III. 648-650. 
16 AN III. 51. 





hierarchy of social relations legitimated by Aristotelian ethics. 
Buddhist social ethics is often interpreted as being more republican 
and egalitarian, due to the Buddha’s historical origins and 
message. 17  Ideally, Theravāda Buddhist virtues are oriented 
towards a mindful loving-kindness that is developed and disclosed 
in practices of morality, mediation, and wisdom. The primary 
example of such mindfulness is the Buddha himself as the 
embodiment of a purely skillful and spontaneous ethical 
responsiveness towards all beings. This openness and situatedness 
also opens up possibilities for misunderstanding and 
misapplication when the person acts, speaks, and thinks without 
mindfulness. The lack of mindfulness might generate the 
conclusion that the first precept of non-harm (ahisā) can be 
bracketed in the name of another good such as the protection of 
Buddhism. Such a perspective is found in utilitarian interpretations 
of Buddhist ethics, where the lives of the many might outweigh 
one life, and in the phenomenon that has been described as 
“Buddhist fundamentalism” by Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and 
Chandra Richard de Silva.18 However, this phenomenon is more 
aptly described as the nationalistic and communalistic use (or 
cooption) of Buddhism, since it is not based in the authority of the 
Pāli Canon, and insofar as the word fundamentalism usually entails 
a return to and literal reading of a canonical or sacred text rather 
than a radical departure from it. 
The majority of the Buddhist suttas forbid violence and war, 
with some interesting exceptions, calling for non-attachment even 
ultimately to Buddhism itself. Such non-attachment is often 
conflated with indifference. Critics of Buddhism often confuse 
non-attachment and indifference, conflating a stereotypical view of 
Stoicism (with its supposed repression of the emotions for the sake 
                                                 
17 David J. Kalupahana, Ethics in Early Buddhism (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1995), 100-101; and Etienne Lamotte, History of Indian 
Buddhism: From the Origins to the Saka Era (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université 
catholique de Louvain, Institut orientaliste, 1988), 10. 
18 This expression is developed in Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R 
de Silva, eds., Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1998). 




of virtue and the equanimity of ataraxia) and Buddhism (which 
calls for recognizing, working with, and transforming emotions).19 
Another critique would reduce Buddhism to the opposite of 
indifference – egotistical self-satisfaction and joy in oneself.20 Yet 
it is clear from the Pāli canon that the Buddha is never portrayed as 
advocating moral indifference to the fate of others. On the contrary, 
the noble person is: “One who is devoted to one’s own welfare and 
cultivates the virtues, while at the same time [being] devoted to the 
welfare of others by causing others to cultivate their virtues.”21 
From a perspective that is critical of the popular or political uses of 
Buddhism, which seem to contradict Buddhist teachings, the 
treatment of Buddhism as a reified cultural identity and exclusive 
possession that excludes others and justifies hostility toward them 
is at odds with its moral content. This politicized Buddhism seems 
to contradict the explicit call for taking up others well-being, and 
in particular, its universalism and cosmopolitanism that extends to 
humanity and indeed the entirety of sentient life. The violent 
promotion of Buddhism as a particular way of life conflicts with 
the very practice and aim of that way of life. This problematic 
nexus between Buddhism and the political is as much an issue for 
contemporary Buddhism, including “engaged Buddhism,” as it is 
for its traditional forms.22 
                                                 
19 For a more nuanced approach to the emotions in Stoicism, see Nussbaum, 
44-45. 
20 See Elizabeth Harris, who has an interesting analysis of such claims in 
“Buddhism in the Media,” in Karma Lekshe Tsomo, ed., Innovative Buddhist 
Women: Swimming against the Stream (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2000). The 
implausible view that Buddhism aims at a stereotypical “Stoic indifference” 
excluding possibilities for transformation is also found in other figures, such as 
Gillian Rose’s critique of what she calls Levinas’ “Buddhist Judaism,” in 
Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37-38. 
21 Kalupahana, op. cit., 76. 
22 For a survey of the relations between Buddhism and political institutions 
and movements in recent Asian history, see the essays gathered in Ian Harris, 
ed., Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia (London: Continuum, 
1999). On the many problems of engaged Buddhist interpretations of Buddhist 
ethics, see Christopher Ives, “Deploying the Dharma: Reflections on the 





Utilitarian and contextualist readings imply that in some cases 
moral agents are justified in sacrificing their own virtues and the 
goods and lives of others for the sake of a greater good. For 
instance, in common dilemmas from moral philosophy, agents 
might be justified in killing one person who would otherwise kill 
hundreds or thousands. The argument that it is legitimate for the 
first precept demanding ahisā to be suspended under limited 
exceptional circumstances, i.e., in order to assimilate some forms 
of self-defense, is itself conditional, since it is clear from the suttas 
that karmic responsibility is unavoidable for killing. One is always 
culpable for killing, although one might be considered more or less 
culpable.23  Violence only creates more violence and, no matter 
how necessary or legitimate it seems, always has its consequences 
such that the end cannot cleanse or sanctify the means. But even 
given this understanding, individuals and groups have felt 
compelled for various reasons to engage in violence, and with 
some justification in cases of compassion for the greater good, as 
in the Jātaka narratives when the Bodhisatta (Skt., Bodhisattva) 
saves the tiger by allowing it to eat him or the ship-captain kills 
one in order to save many, or for the sake of self-defense.24 As 
Peter Harvey notes, despite any moral dilemma: “Most lay 
Buddhists have been prepared to break the precept against killing 
in self-defense, and many have joined in the defense of the 
community in times of need.”25 
Reflection on the history of South and South-East Asia 
illustrates that the Buddha’s commitment to non-harm and non-
violence has often been in tension with political institutions that 
have never abandoned the right to use force and established social 
                                                                                                             
Methodology of Constructive Buddhist Ethics,” in Journal of Buddhist Ethics 15 
(2008): 23-44. 
23 Hammalawa Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 
2003), 60. 
24 On compassionate killing, see Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist 
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 135. H. Saddhatissa 
introduces the self-defense of the community through a comparison with Plato’s 
Republic (Ibid, 114), although violence is simultaneously seen as a condition of 
decline (Ibid, 120, 124). 
25 Peter Harvey, op. cit., 255. 




practices involving the mistreatment of other humans and animals. 
The idea that ahisā is a primary virtue has coexisted with its 
repeated violation. Since the canonical virtue of ahisā can be 
overridden by the weight of circumstances in societies that have 
claimed to promote the Dhamma, it is worthwhile to consider the 
logic at work in the justification of internal coercion and external 
war. This raises the question of whether violence is inherently 
incompatible with the Dhamma, as the Buddha is generally 
portrayed as advocating, or whether there is a “Buddhist just war 
theory” based on other canonical sources and non-canonical 
popular “lived” practices and ways of reasoning? Although 
Ananda Abeysekara denies this apparent paradox by arguing that 
Buddhism cannot be separated into an authentic philosophical 
discourse stemming from the Buddha and popular violence, since 
they are contingent and constructed categories, this paradox cannot 
be evaded if Buddhism does not only consist of practices but 
normative claims that can potentially problematize those very 
practices.26 
 
3. Virtue and Engagement 
 
In many senses, Buddhism is inherently ethically engaged. 
Buddhism is about practices and a way of life, and the Buddha 
called for the appropriate practice of the virtues.27 Compassion, 
generosity, and loving-kindness are primary Theravāda virtues. 
These are genuinely altruistic and other-oriented since they are 
ultimately not done out of any “need” but out of freedom. 28 
Although Richard Gombrich is correct when he asserts that the 
Buddha’s primary goal was not social reform but spiritual 
liberation,29 the historical Buddha remains an ethical model and 
exemplar who confronted social injustices, such as caste hierarchy 
                                                 
26 See his Colors of the Robe: Religion, Identity, and Difference (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 204. 
27 SN I. 73. 
28 SN I. 25. 
29 Richard Gombrich, Theravāda Buddhism (London: Routledge, 1988), 30, 
68. 





and the exclusion of “untouchables,” and the social pathologies of 
violence and war. He did not do so because he was commanded to 
do so to avoid punishment by a divine being, but because of an 
insight into the moral nexus of kamma (karma), which as moral is 
never simply a predetermined fate or destiny.30 He is described as 
responding immanently from out of his own condition to the 
concrete suffering of others. Although the Buddha’s initial 
encounter with the suffering of others can be interpreted as 
reflecting his concern about suffering the same afflictions, as being 
self-interested, it is still his being affected by the other’s suffering 
– the disquiet, sickness, old age, and death of others – that set him 
on the path of awakening.31 This encounter with and uncalculated 
response to suffering provided the basis for kamma becoming 
ethical and the universe a basically moral arena in early 
Buddhism.32 
It is sometimes argued that “socially engaged Buddhism” is a 
relatively new and western inspired phenomenon. First, this claim 
presupposes that something else is meant by “engagement” than 
traditional forms of Buddhist ethical engagement for sentient life. 
Second, this claim is inaccurate insofar as engaged Buddhism is 
not merely a contemporary western construct insofar as there are 
qualities in traditional Buddhism allowing contemporary western 
redeployments. Third, whereas “Western” interpretations often 
focus on the individualism of Buddhism, and there are elements 
emphasizing working for one’s own salvation, Asian Buddhists 
have interpreted kamma as inherently social. Kamma inherently 
binds one to others, forming a network of freedom and fate, and 
responsibility extends beyond the immediacy of the moment into 
the past and future of this and other lives.33 Further, a number of 
                                                 
30 I develop this argument concerning the moral character of karma in 
“Questioning Karma,” 353-373. 
31 On the general importance of feeling, affective response and moral 
sentiment in Buddhist thought and practice, see Keown, The Nature of Buddhist 
Ethics, 68-78. 
32 Gombrich, 69. 
33 On the social character of karma and responsibility, see Jonathan S. 
Walters, “Communal Karma and Karmic Community in Theravāda Buddhist 




contemporary ethical issues such as the moral status of animals and 
the environment are arguably more fully articulated in Buddhist 
than in traditional western discourses. 34  The modern focus on 
social activism and engagement is motivated by enlightenment 
ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity and the social movements 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As varied responses of 
historical agents, who can interpret and engage their contexts and 
are not the mere passive product of colonial hegemony, anti-
colonial liberation struggles involve a multiplicity of traditions and 
inspirations that are more than their Western and Christian sources. 
Socially engaged Buddhism, inconceivable without its Asian 
sources, brings traditions of Buddhist ethical reflection to bear on 
contemporary moral and social issues. If ethical insights of the 
Dhamma are needed in a world that all too readily resorts to 
intolerance, persecution, and violence, then vigilance concerning 
the possible dangers (whether to non-Buddhists or to Buddhists 
themselves) of inappropriately and unskillfully engaging Buddhist 
ethics remains vital to such engagement for peace, social justice, 
and the common welfare. These dangers are apparent in the history 
of Asian Buddhism and should serve to stimulate Western 
                                                                                                             
History,” in J. C. Holt, J. N. Kinnard, and Jonathan S. Walters, Constituting 
Communities (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), 9-39, see especially 10, 18, 28. 
According to Walters, the notion of rebirth in Sri Lankan popular Buddhism 
only deepens one’s sense of responsibility for others and the social character of 
karma. My relations with others are unavoidable, given that I am bound to them 
not only in this life but in others as well. The suffering that I ignore today, 
because I believe the other person deserves that suffering because of past deeds, 
will become part of my own suffering. 
34 The notion of social engagement said to be lacking in traditional 
Buddhism is not so much a traditional Christian idea, which is not necessarily 
altruistic or purely ethical in the Kantian sense since charity is done for the 
reward of salvation rather than purely for its own sake, as it is a modern one 
emerging from the moral and political thought of the enlightenment. Compare 
Rita Gross’s discussion of the claim that Christianity is the source of socially 
engaged Buddhism in Soaring and Settling: Buddhist Perspectives on 
Contemporary Social and Religious Issues (New York: Continuum, 1998), 13-
18. No doubt, the encounter between East and West has promoted contemporary 
engaged Buddhism, yet this would have remained unlikely if it did not have a 
basis within Buddhism itself. 





reflection on the character and potential consequences of moral 
and political engagement. 
The first danger is the possibility of the Dhamma being 
appropriated by and limited to a political program such that it 
becomes part of the ideological legitimation of problematic 
political practices and institutions. One is unlikely to critically 
engage a political order with which one is complicit. In engaging 
politics, Buddhism – like any other philosophy, religion, or way of 
life – risks becoming an instrument of the state or a party. 
Providing an ethical basis for action, and morality is the basis of 
practice35, entails establishing a foundation for the justification and 
legitimation of action, although living morally is distinguished 
from being attached to and anxious about right and wrong as 
viewpoints. 36  On the one hand, this makes ethics and moral 
judgment possible. On the other hand, it opens up the danger of 
losing the ethical in its very institutionalization. There are 
numerous historical examples that show how moral values and 
ideals are used to excuse horror such that peace becomes war, 
justice turns into injustice, humanitarian compassion justifies 
violence, and freedom is turned into tyranny. Connections with the 
state, the military, political parties and economic powers have at 
times morally compromised Buddhism and can do so again in the 
future. This is not without its rationale within Buddhism, which 
often – analogously to the Christian two kingdom doctrine of the 
earthly and divine kingdoms – either accommodated itself to the 
state or left it to its own devices.37 
Social engagement or activism, which counters tendencies 
toward the privatization of moral questions, is by itself an 
insufficient condition or criterion for addressing structural and 
institutional social-political issues that concern issues of power, 
justice, and equality that involve more than the intentions and good 
will of individual agents.38 Buddhism should not be reduced to 
                                                 
35 DN I. 206. 
36 DN I. 26. 
37 See Gombrich, 70 and 116. 
38 Ives makes the important point that Buddhist ethics addresses individual 
suffering and the individual’s response to suffering more than it does the social-




engagement because it is “other-worldly” but insofar as 
engagement blinds one to the need for mindfulness and 
comprehension (sapajāno) in general and comprehension of 
suitability (sappaya sapajāno) or the “art of practicality” in 
particular. This art involves skillfulness and appropriateness in the 
choice of the right means (Pāli, upaya-kusala; Skt., upāya-
kauśalya) for the right situation at the right moment, which Mark 
Siderits translates as “pedagogical skill” and Jan Nattier more 
broadly as “tactical skill.”39 This virtue is one that the Buddha 
preeminently exemplified. 
Although the Dhamma is oriented towards peace, moral 
responsibility and compassion, a second danger can be seen in 
attempts to use Buddhism to justify violence and war. The various 
forms of Japanese Buddhism, subordinated to the interests of the 
Imperial state and state-Shinto after the persecutions of the Meiji 
era, became part of a militaristic system of justifying expansion, 
colonization, and war.40 It was the reduction of the Dhamma to 
socio-political interests that legitimated acting contrary to the 
Dhamma. Distinguishing “reactionary” and “progressive” 
engagement by itself does not resolve this issue. Imperial Japan’s 
political and militaristic use of Buddhism and the support of 
aggressive war by the majority of Japanese Buddhists are one 
powerful example employed by critics of the social role of 
Buddhism such as Brian Victoria.41 Yet this question can be raised 
in contemporary contexts. There are Buddhists who actively work 
for the non-violent resolution of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, for 
example the Buddhists involved in Sarvodaya Shramadana, while 
                                                                                                             
political diagnosis of suffering in Ives, “Deploying the Dharma: Reflections on 
the Methodology of Constructive Buddhist Ethics,” 35. 
39 Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 2007), 58; and Jan Nattier usefully explores the different 
senses of “tactical skill,” involving more than teaching or pedagogy, in A Few 
Good Men: The Bodhisattva Path according to The Inquiry of Ugra (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2003), 154-156. 
40 The extent of this complicity and active engagement has become apparent 
from the work of Brian Daizen Victoria, Zen at War (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005) and Zen War Stories (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
41 Ibid. 





other Buddhists have played a significant role in intensifying and 
participating in the conflict. 42  We can thus find at least two 
conflicting models of socially engaged Buddhism in contemporary 
Sri Lanka, one “for peace” and the other “for war.” 
What lessons should be drawn from uses of Buddhism that 
seem morally problematic or unvirtuous by Buddhist ethical 
criteria? Are there sources within Buddhist teaching, as Brian 
Victoria has argued of Zen and Tessa Bartholomeusz of Sri Lankan 
Theravāda, which potentially legitimate violence and war?43 The 
first precept, or first moral rule, of Buddhism seems clear: I 
undertake the precept to refrain from destroying living creatures 
(Panatipata veramani sikkhapadam samadiyami). The first precept 
of ahisā, a vow taken to dedicate oneself to non-harm and non-
violence, does not seem a promising start for justifying violence 
and yet it is not the case that individuals and groups claiming to be 
Buddhist have never engaged in violence. One can blame this on 
the imperfection of human character, and accordingly people often 
distinguish the pleasant ideal from the unpleasant reality. This 
separation of norms and practices, besides being dualistic, 
precludes critical discussion and leaves unanswered the question of 
whether there are possible sources within Buddhist teaching for 
departing from the moral demand of ahisā to not harm sentient 
beings. 
 
4. Virtue, Violence, and War 
 
Through hatred, hatred is never overcome; through non-hatred, hatred is always 
overcome – this is the eternal law.44 
 
The obligation to cultivate compassion, loving-kindness, 
respect, and reverence for all human and sentient life does not 
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seem a hopeful beginning for the justification of war. The 
argument that it is better to suffer harm than to do harm appears 
less auspicious for legitimating violence of any kind. Buddhists 
and non-Buddhists alike often take for granted that there is no 
legitimate Buddhist justification of war much less a Buddhist 
tradition of just-war theory. To use violence is to betray the 
Buddha’s teachings: “There is a person who abstains from the 
destruction of life; with the rod and the weapon laid aside, he is 
conscientious and kindly and dwells compassionately towards all 
living beings.”45 
There are noticeable historical exceptions to the obvious 
interpretation of the Buddha’s first precept demanding non-harm. 
Traditional Buddhist kings have raised and used armies. Buddhist 
monks have developed and used martial arts. In Medieval China 
and Japan, monks have justified killing, carried weapons, formed 
armies, and been involved in rebellions.46 Tibetan Buddhism tells 
of a future king who will militarily liberate them from external 
oppression in the stories associated with Shambhala and the 
Kalachakra Tantra. Japanese Buddhists supported the expansion 
of imperial Japan. There are questionable relations between 
Buddhists and the military in countries such as Burma and 
Thailand. Currently in Sri Lanka, Theravāda monks and laity have 
been implicated in persecution and violence in the Sri Lankan 
ethnic conflict and civil war. 
Because of (1) the Buddha’s rejection of violence and war as a 
legitimate means of achieving one’s ends and (2) the long history 
and dedication to peace and non-violent social change in the 
Buddhist tradition, it is important to reflect on these historical 
exceptions. The powerful ethical character of Buddhism can be 
seen from the Buddha’s critique of war, violence and social 
injustice to more contemporary movements as diverse as the 
Vietnamese peace movement of the 1960’s, the Tibetan struggle 
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for religious freedom, the Burmese pro-democracy movement, and 
in Sir Lanka the lay Sarvodaya Shramadana movement for peace, 
communal self-help, and popular empowerment. 
Counterexamples to what is often considered normative 
Buddhism, which was a plural and contested Asian “construct” 
before it was a western one, implicitly reveal the moral character 
of Buddhism in limiting and countering the drive to hatred, 
violence and war by the very fact that violence is deeply 
problematic in Buddhism. Those claiming to be Buddhists who 
engage in war are forced to appeal to the limited and contested (in 
Buddhist thought) idea of self-defense or to a questionable 
antinomian non-attachment to the ethical core of Buddhism itself –
loving-kindness and compassion. Although one cannot and should 
not expect to exclude all possibilities for self-defense and 
especially non-violent resistance, practices contradicting this 
minimalist idea reveal that other motives and self-deception can be 
at work. Rather than there being a general “antinomianism” or 
“nihilism” inherently at work in Buddhism, as Brian Victoria 
contends, the problem lies in the ambiguity about moral 
appropriateness, including skillful means and skillfulness in 
Buddhism. Buddhist ethics does not advocate the application of 
one single rule or principle that is eternally and universally valid in 
all cases but involves ethics understood as (1) appropriateness, (2) 
a way of life, and (3) part of the way.47 Although it is not the end 
or entirety of the Buddhist path, morality is its necessary 
prerequisite.48 
Because of the virtue-ethical and context-sensitive character of 
Buddhism, a number of Buddhists and non-Buddhists suggest that 
there is a condition that transcends ethics, even understood as 
ethical virtues and appropriateness. One abandons morality, just as 
one abandons the raft that gets one to the other side of the river. 
Yet going beyond good and evil as unconditional absolutes and as 
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discriminatory attachments does not entail transcending ethics as 
one’s way of existing or dwelling. The art of suitability and 
skillfulness is not unethical in being anti-essentialist, as it directs 
the mind to considering the context and the level of understanding 
of oneself and others. This prudential context-sensitivity has and 
can be misunderstood as an excuse for unethical behavior among 
some Buddhist individuals and groups. Buddhist ethics at its 
simplest levels appeals to prudential self-interest, especially 
through the popular logic of merit and merit transfer that is the 
dominant form of popular Buddhist practice in Sri Lanka;49 yet 
continuing to act out of self-interested motives is canonically 
considered only the lowest level of moral action.50 Egotistical self-
interest and attachment to one’s own individual or group 
superiority undermines the basic equality of sentient beings that is 
asserted in the Buddhist tradition as well as the fundamental 
practices and virtues of loving kindness (mettā), generosity (dāna), 
and compassion (karuā). 
It is fair to say that Buddhism does not endorse the use of 
violence. Still it is untrue that Buddhists – or at least individuals 
and groups claiming to be Buddhists and engaging in at least some 
of the practices associated with Buddhism – never engage in acts 
of war, hatred, and conflict. This is no doubt caused by human 
imperfection. Nevertheless, it should not just be accepted as human 
imperfection, since such actions always involve accruing kamma 
(karma) and Buddhism insists that beings strive for and realize 
universal wisdom and compassion. The Buddhist emphasis on non-
attachment, including to itself, and developing universal 
compassion and self-criticism, especially of inadequate 
understandings of Buddhism, demands a greater emphasis on and 
means to critique one’s own behavior towards others. The 
aggressive and brutal colonialism justified by Japanese Buddhists, 
the right-wing rhetoric and practices of some Sri Lankan monks 
and laity, and the connections between Buddhism and the military 
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in Burma, serve as important examples of the dangers of treating 
Buddhism as a cultural possession or ideology of political 
legitimation, of taking it as an end rather than a means and a way.51 
 
5. Skilful Means and Moral Appropriateness 
 
Nor to do any evil, but cultivate the good, to purify one’s mind, this the Buddhas 
teach.52 
 
Tessa Bartholomeusz, whose detailed critical account of just 
war thinking in Sri Lanka I will partly rely on and partly critically 
modify in section five, has located the issue of violence in the 
pragmatic and prudential character of Buddhist ethics.53  She is 
correct to the extent that Buddhist ethics is not based in rigidly 
following one principle or rule but is a way of life grounded in the 
cultivation of multiple precepts or virtues. Even authors such as 
David Kalupahana, for whom Buddhist ethics is principally an 
ethics of principle, acknowledge that the principle can be modified 
according to new circumstances. 54 When there are new 
circumstances or a conflict between two different virtues or moral 
rules, this question becomes pressing: one must decide the moral 
dilemma through a sense of what is appropriate. When a principle 
becomes uncertain, it can only be interpreted rather than 
mechanically applied. A system of rules does not provide an 
infinite number of further rules explaining how to apply them. That 
is, there cannot be, on pain of infinite regress, another principle 
stating how to apply the first principle. This means that there is no 
further precept to explain the first precept of ahisā. In cases of 
moral conflict, one has to adjudicate the sense of ahisā through 
the context of Buddhist ethics as a whole and the pressing features 
of the situation itself. This raises the question of whether the first 
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precept can be outweighed at times by other considerations such as 
utilitarian considerations of sacrificing one life in order to save 
multiple lives. Can one then in exceptional circumstances destroy 
or allow one life to be destroyed in order to save the lives of a 
community or multitude of individuals? 
This reasoning about exceptions and the force of necessity is 
not only an abstract and speculative question. It has occurred 
within Buddhist historical traditions and has given birth to a 
Buddhist tradition that has been likened by some scholars to 
western “just-war theory.” Just war theory seeks to explain the 
circumstances under which it might be legitimate or at least 
necessary to take life in armed conflict. Whereas scholars of 
Theravāda such as Damien Keown have argued that killing can 
sometimes be a legitimate response to suffering, other scholars 
such as Rupert Gethin have rejected this argument since it does not 
address dukkha as a reality that must be understood and worked 
through rather than suppressed. 55  The issue is not that people 
claiming to be Buddhists at times engage in violence and war in 
the name of self-defense. It is difficult if not impossible to demand 
the saintliness according to which it is illegitimate to defend one’s 
parents, family, friends or community under any circumstances. 
The problem is the “slippery slope,” i.e., when and how this 
reasoning can go wrong and become an ideological excuse for 
morally illegitimate violence and war. 
The expression “skill in means” or “skillful means” (Skt., 
upāyakauśalya; Pāli, upayakusala) is a basic Mahāyāna concept, 
developed in the context of the compassion and wisdom of the 
Bodhisattva, and rarely found in the Pāli canon. The roots of this 
expression, both upaya (“way, means, or resource”) and in 
particular kusala (“skillful, profitable or expedient,” often used as 
equivalent for “good, moral, or wholesome”), are present in the 
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Pāli Canon.56 Upaya, the ability of the Buddha to teach at different 
levels according to the understanding of the recipients, is restricted 
to the Buddha. Kusala – skillfulness and wholesomeness as 
opposed to unskillfulness and unwholesomeness – in action, 
thought, and word is advocated for all following the path in 
Theravāda Buddhism. 57  The use of a number of expressions 
indicating different abilities and capacities requiring 
appropriateness and skillfulness – such as kusala, sappaya, upaya, 
and yoniso manasikārā (wise or appropriate attention), 
ugghatitaññu (swiftness of understanding), patisambhida (the 
knowledge to appropriately discriminate things) – can be seen in 
the Pāli Canon. 
For the Buddha, in the Sangiti Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, there 
are “three kinds of skill: skill in progress, skill in regress, and skill 
in means” (tini kosallani: aya kosallam, apaya kosallam, upaya 
kosallam).58 The use of upaya kosallam in this context shows that 
skillful means is not foreign to the sense of skillfulness in the Pāli 
Canon and that it is not limited to the Buddha, at the same time as 
the Buddha perfectly embodies such skillfulness. 59  Skill in the 
Buddha’s discourses does not seem to mean casuistry, cleverness 
or a merely calculative pragmatic prudence that is more political 
than ethical. It is an art that cultivates a moral ability and insight 
consisting of appropriately applying the Dhamma to the situation. 
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This is confirmed by another reference to the aptness of 
skillfulness in the Nava Sutta of the Sutta-nipāta, where it is said 
that the one who knows Dhamma is like the skillful boatman who 
is able to ferry others across a dangerous river. 60  Here again 
appropriateness is explained as being like an art or craft such that it 
is not simply the mechanical application of an abstract principle. 
In another passage, understanding what is fitting and skillfully 
attending is the basis of wisdom.61 In the Avijjā Sutta, skillfulness 
is associated with knowing and ignorance, when the Buddha is said 
to discuss how ignorance leads to unskillful qualities and knowing 
to skillful ones. 62  In The Group of Ones, appropriateness and 
skillfulness are interconnected such that both are essential to the 
path: “A bhikkhu who attends appropriately abandons what is 
unskillful and develops what is skillful.”63 This use of “skillful,” 
which points to the cultivation of spontaneous activity as in 
learning a craft to the point where it becomes second nature, is not 
accidental to the Buddha’s discourses. 
Not only morality but also meditation is often compared to a 
skill that requires development. For example, in the Aguttara 
Nikāya, the Buddha said: “Just as monks, an archer, or his 
apprentice might practice on a straw man or a pile of clay, and 
thereby later become a long-distance shot, an impeccable 
marksman who can fell a large body, just so it is with a monk who 
reaches the destruction of the taints in dependence on the first 
jhana.”64 This sense of skill provides a partial basis for the later 
Mahāyāna reinterpretation and extension of skillfulness (kusala) as 
skillful means or skill in means (upāya-kauśalya). In early 
Mahāyāna texts such as the Skill in Means Sūtra (Upāyakauśalya 
Sūtra), and canonical texts such as the Lotus Sūtra, morality is 
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fully absorbed into or subordinated to compassion such that the 
compassion of the Bodhisattva transcends the cultivation of the 
precepts considered as rules or virtues.65 
Insofar as Theravāda ethics, like most Buddhist and many 
forms of non-Buddhist ethics such as Aristotelian and Confucian, 
is a form of virtue ethics, it faces the issue of appropriate action. If 
this is the case, then acting from the precepts, and the Vinaya in 
general, cannot be reduced to legalistic external conformity with 
them. Codes, precepts, and rules demand the ability to distinguish 
between the hypocrisy of breaking them for one’s own advantage 
and the moral insight to adopt them to circumstances. For example, 
a Sri Lankan bhikkhu should not possess money, yet it might not 
be inappropriate for him to carry money for purposes that are 
difficult to avoid such as for bus fare to get across town.66 Rules 
cannot be mechanically applied but require the skillful application 
of the Dhamma in acting in the proverbial right way at the right 
time in the right place.67 A third source of the use of skillfulness in 
contemporary Theravāda Buddhism would be from the growing 
knowledge of Mahāyāna traditions of interpretation. 
Is the Buddhist notion of skillfulness too open or ambiguous 
such that it can possibly justify unethical behavior in the name of a 
greater good? Can it potentially be used to justify behavior 
contrary to the basic ethical principles of Buddhism such as the 
Buddha’s critique of violence and war? This question of 
skillfulness seems a more basic issue than that of ethical 
antinomianism and nihilism developed in some western critiques 
of Buddhism, since context-sensitive appropriateness would 
provide the justification for going “beyond good and evil” and 
other such expressions.68 This is not only a potential problem in 
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Zen or Mahāyāna but in all Buddhism, given that the issue of 
appropriateness is already significant in the Pāli Canon and in 
contemporary Theravāda Buddhism. 
 
6. Buddhism and Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka 
 
To turn now to a “case study” of the relation between Buddhist 
ethics and violence, I will consider the long-running civil war in 
Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan conflict has its origins in the 
development of Sinhalese nationalism in response to British 
colonialism and during the post-war independence movement. The 
British played off Sinhalese and Tamil interests and sentiments in 
order to retain power during the colonial period, much as they did 
in their other colonies. The postcolonial period saw the deepening 
of various narratives of ethic self-identity among both the 
Sinhalese and the Tamil populations. Successive democratically 
elected Sri Lankan governments have reflected the interests and 
aspirations of the Sinhalese, contributing to Tamil sentiments of 
disentitlement. The resulting episodic civil war has killed over 
65,000 people since the 1980’s. 
The ethnic conflict has occurred between a series of elected 
governments, led by various parities from the right to the left who 
have been supported by the mostly Buddhist Sinhalese majority, 
and the terrorist – insofar as suicide bombings, assassinations, 
eliminating all Tamil rivals, etc., are terrorist – and or self-
described “liberation” organization Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) organization based in the mostly non-Buddhist 
Tamil minority. 69  The best option for both sides would be a 
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peaceful resolution and mutual cooperation, which seems presently 
unlikely. On the one hand, there is much to criticize in the Sri 
Lankan government and Sinhalese nationalists, from people who 
claim to be conserving and defending Buddhism and its role in Sri 
Lankan life to socialist populists, who have flamed the passions of 
war. On the other hand, the legitimate grievances of the Tamil 
population are used to support an authoritarian, nationalistic, and 
violent organization.70 
Representatives of “engaged Buddhism” and “critical 
Buddhism” want to free Buddhism from what they describe as its 
traditional complicity with unjust social and political institutions 
and practices. They frequently point to Imperial Japan and the 
current conflict in Sri Lanka as primary examples that prove 
traditional Buddhism’s complicity with violence, exploitation, and 
domination.71 This argument appeals, in the case of Sri Lanka, to 
the fact that some Theravāda Buddhist monks and laity have been 
implicated in violence and calls for violence against the LTTE and 
/ or the Tamil population. Any adequate consideration of this 
conflict begins to reveal the need for a more nuanced and 
differentiating approach to the question of what role Buddhism 
plays in the current conflict. This conflict raises two significant 
questions: (1) What is the role of Buddhism in promoting the 
conflict? (2) What are the arguments for and against the justice of 
war in the Buddhist traditions of Sri Lanka? The second question 
can be made more exact in the following terms: What possible 
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justifications of violence are there in (i) the Pāli Canon, (ii) tales 
about Aśoka – who has both righteous and violent traits72 – and the 
universal wheel-turning monarch (cakkavatti), (iii) postcanonical 
Sinhalese narratives of kingship and nation such as the 
Mahāvamsa, 73  and, finally, (iv) contemporary postcolonial Sri 
Lankan Buddhism? 
In the remainder of this paper, I will sketch out a possible 
answer addressing a few aspects of these questions. One strategy is 
to analyze Buddhist ideas in the context of western just-war and 
ethical theory and conclude that Buddhism as it informs the 
“popular” actions and practices of living Buddhist communities is 
more complex than its normative or “elite” ideal. Buddhist lands 
do not only involve traditions of nonviolence and loving kindness. 
They also have had a long history of thinking about and engaging 
in internal and external physical conflict. That is, wars from which 
reasoned as well as opportunistic assertions of the possible justice 
or unfortunate necessity of war can emerge. Buddhism privileges 
non-violence while at the same time self-described Buddhists have 
justified and engaged in war under certain conditions. 
Buddhism is a diverse set of norms and practices; and this 
diversity is also true of Sri Lankan Buddhism where one can see 
three approaches to the question of war. First, there is a position 
that Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra Richard de Silva call 
Buddhist fundamentalism.74 Yet fundamentalism suggests a return 
to the fundamentals of Buddhism, which in this case would mean 
to renounce violence as a means. As Mahinda Deegalle argues this 
position is not so much Buddhist as it is Sinhalese nationalist, 
which appropriates Buddhism as a symbol of Sinhalese heritage 
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and identity.75 This raises the interesting question whether there is 
actually such a thing as religious fundamentalism. Many 
movements labeled as fundamentalist seem to be more about the 
use of the religious for nationalistic economic and political 
interests. The nationalist and “just war” positions can both appeal 
to the Mahāvamsa, which describes the Buddha’s legendary visits 
to Sri Lanka and the military victories of ancient Sinhalese 
Buddhist kings against invading Hindu Tamils.76 
The nationalists explicitly demands that the Sinhala-Tamil 
conflict must conclude not only with the defeat of the LTTE but 
also with the restoration of a unified and fully Sinhalese and 
Buddhist Sri Lanka. Their argument for war generally follows a 
three step legitimation of anti-Tamil sentiment: (1) Sinhala and 
Buddhist identity constitute a unity that is radically distinct from 
the Dravidian Hindu Tamil interlopers from South India; (2) Sri 
Lanka is the island of Dhamma (dhammadvipa) ordained by the 
Buddha himself (during his three apocryphal visits) for Buddhism 
such that the whole island is a sacred relic of the Buddha’s and the 
loss of its integrity would destroy this legacy; and (3) the justice of 
a defensive war for the Dhamma justifies the preservation of Sri 
Lanka in its unity as a majority Sinhalese Buddhist nation through 
military action against the Tamils, identified with the invading 
damila of the medieval epics, thus associating the present dispute 
with past threats as well as the fear of tiny Sri Lanka being 
submerged in the vastness of India. Bartholomeusz contends that it 
is paradoxically Buddhist beliefs about pacifism – i.e., that 
Buddhists are more fair, tolerant, and peaceful – that leads 
Buddhists to differentiate themselves from others and turn to 
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violence to protect that very ideal. The perceived need to preserve 
endangered Buddhist peacefulness creates the conditions for 
violence. 77  Yet Buddhism is not so much the cause of such 
attitudes as it – or rather its surface historical facticity as uniquely 
Sinhalese – is instrumentally incorporated into conservative 
Sinhalese discourses and, more generally, the Sinhalese side of the 
“ethnic outbidding” that Neil DeVotta characterizes as a cancer 
eating away at Sri Lankan political life.78 
The second range of views might be characterized as the 
moderate justification of the use of force, and maintains the justice 
of undertaking “defensive military action” against insurgencies 
even if the insurgents draw on some legitimate grievances. The 
war is interpreted as the defense of the territorial integrity and 
peace of the nation, as a proper function of the modern secular 
state, and/or the defense of the nation’s endangered Buddhist 
identity. This model appeals to the conventional model of 
international law and its account of the justice and limits of war as 
well as to Buddhist principles such as maximizing well-being. 
Assuming one is attacked, and if common well-being outweighs 
the well-being of the attacker, it is then justifiable to defend 
oneself, one’s parents and family, one’s fellow citizens, including 
if it involves violence and killing. This argument is of course 
reasonable, and self-defense is not without its pragmatic 
justification and traditional authority. The problem is that such 
arguments often move imperceptibly from the exceptional 
justification of minimal violence under “conditions of necessity” to 
the ideological normalization of the state of war. Violence, once it 
is justified as an exception, becomes the norm from which there 
seems no escape. The ethical loses its normative and critical force 
and becomes part of the social reproduction and intensification of 
conflict rather than a medium of its resolution. 
There are multiple strategies used by Sri Lankans to answer the 
question of how Buddhists can justify engaging in conflict and war. 
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Some stress the unfortunate necessity of military action despite its 
negative karmic consequences. Others, perhaps motivated by the 
need for a more inspirational message, suggest that righteous war 
(i.e., one with a morally legitimate goal and fought in an honorable 
fashion with morally acceptable means) has meritorious karmic 
consequences. Both strategies presuppose that the precept of 
nonviolence is a prima facie rather than an absolute duty such that 
nonviolence is a first duty that can be overridden under certain 
circumstances as a last resort.79 
Theravāda ethics, especially when it is interpreted textually 
through the Pāli Canon, places absolute value on acting out of 
compassion and avoiding harm. In practice, Sri Lankan Buddhists 
reason with a plurality of context-sensitive prima facie duties. The 
precept against violence is not absolute and can be overridden by 
more pressing obligations such as defense of one’s parents, country, 
or the Dhamma. The Buddha’s account of moral skillfulness 
suggests, according to this reading, the use of practical judgment or 
a sense of appropriateness to apply moral principles to the situation. 
The Buddha’s precepts are primary and conflicts between precepts 
require contextual reasoning that employs considerations that some 
have compared with utilitarian (maximizing compassion and 
minimizing suffering) and others to virtue ethical (the effects 
actions have on one’s condition) reasoning. In this way, Buddhist 
ethical reasoning is used to justify violence for the sake of 
nonviolence and the Sri Lankan government’s claim to wage “war 
for peace.” The justification of war requires the fulfillment of 
certain conditions comparable to Christian and western just war 
criteria. A number of Sri Lankan Buddhists, in line with traditional 
justifications of war in the Buddhist kingdoms of South-East 
Asia,80 appeal to the Hindu Bhagavad-Gītā and the Pan-Indic idea 
that the ruler (rāja) and warriors (katriya) fulfilling their military 
duties are exempt from ahisā. 
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Historically numerous leaders and societies claiming to be 
Buddhist have had armies, police forces, prisons, etc., with actual 
weapons and the possibility of using them. This is based in Pan-
Indian ideas about kingship and in several Buddhist traditions. In 
the Pāli canon, the Buddha abandoned becoming a universal 
wheel-turning monarch in order to become liberated. This 
prioritized liberation, and the renunciation of violence and harm 
that is essential to its realization, yet at the same time was 
interpreted as giving a derivative or secondary legitimacy to 
political leadership. Such monarchs are portrayed as universally 
wise and generous but do not abandon the state’s monopoly on 
force. This model of righteous kingship is the basis for the 
Buddhist warrior-kings of the Mahāvamsa that continue to have 
national appeal. 
Popular Sri Lankan Buddhism incorporates a tacit “just war 
theory” according to which war is justifiable when fought with the 
appropriate intent and means. The Sinhalese supporters of war 
appeal to such ideas of the legitimacy of defensive war, which is 
defined by the compassionate intention to protect rather than the 
negative motivations of anger, greed or hatred. It is interesting that 
“militant Sinhalese nationalists,” insofar as they still claim to 
operate within the framework of Buddhism, frequently appeal to a 
widener or more extensive notion of defensive war (such as the 
unity of “Buddhist Sri Lanka” as a whole) since canonical 
Buddhism provides no basis for offensive or aggressive war.81 
Buddhism does not have the tradition of offensive “holy war” and, 
since motivation and intention are more important than external 
ritual and obedience, there is no basis for war to convert others by 
force even for their own good – which leaves open the question of 
the tacit violence or implicit coercive power of education, 
socialization, and the socio-economic reproduction of society. 
The first militant nationalistic and second moderate pro-war 
Sinhalese positions described above are differentiated by the 
portrayal of what is being defended and what means are justifiable. 
This remains an active question given the fragility of peace, the 
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continuation of death and destruction, the conflicting assertions 
about the “righteousness” of each side, and the competing claims 
about the justice and injustice of military action. 
Finally, in a third type of position, there are Sri Lankan 
Buddhists who reject all and any violence as an impediment to 
nibbāna (nirvāa) and who have been prominently engaged in 
promoting the peace process and reconciliation. Bartholomeusz 
contends that this must be a consequence of giving the first precept 
of ahisā a deontological status. That is, it is a universally valid 
principle and duty that is applicable regardless of circumstances 
and has no exceptions. The Buddha does not claim that violence is 
only sometimes wrong but that violence, no matter how righteous, 
always produces more violence; and warriors, no matter how 
virtuous, always suffer the consequences of war. However, the 
Buddhist precepts do not have to be interpreted according to the 
model of rule based ethics, or applying a conceptual principle to all 
cases, in order for Buddhists to unconditionally reject war. The 
most appropriate skillfulness may well generally result in the 
rejection of violence and war given its personal costs and karmic 
consequences. This position is adopted by the majority of Sri 
Lankan intellectuals, such as Walpola Rahula, who wrote in 1959 
that “Violence in any form, under any pretext whatsoever, is 
absolutely against the teaching of the Buddha.”82 
According to the Buddha, “Conquest begets enmity; the 
conquered live in misery; and the peaceful live happily having 
renounced both conquest and defeat.”83 This position is in fact the 
only consistent one with the Pāli Canon, if not later non-canonical 
Sinhalese texts such as the Mahāvamsa that are also historically 
significant in shaping Sinhalese self-interpretations of their own 
identity and the possibility – albeit limited and tenuous – of a 
Buddhist theory of “just war.” This difference shows the value of 
not reducing the normative dimension of Buddhism to its popular 
manifestations, and of not minimizing canonical texts and the 
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“philosophical” dimension of Buddhism in the face of its “violent” 
lived reality.84 Since norms and exemplars are richly embodied in 
images and narratives, the distinction between normative claims 
and actual practices does not entail the reduction of Buddhism’s 
symbolic dimension to an impoverished rationalized shadow. 
Exemplars and norms often serve a critical, regulative, and self-
reforming function, providing a textured fabric and context to 
which individuals can appeal so as to engage their circumstances 
and practices differently. If it is illegitimate to isolate and reify 
supposedly “elite” normative or canonical Buddhism on the 
authority of “anti-essentialism,” it seems similarly problematic to 
eliminate all normative and regulative claims in the name of 
“popular practices.” 
 
7. Conclusion: Virtue and Violence 
 
The Sri Lankan conflict is not exclusively a question of one 
individual’s insight and virtue in my estimation. If it was, it would 
not be at such an impasse. It is a structural crisis that requires a 
political solution that has to rely on a plurality of ethical, religious, 
and social possibilities and voices. My claim here contradicts 
current tendencies that (1) seek to privatize social problems into 
issues of personal virtue or (2) reduce the plurality of public life to 
one vision of the good life and/or religious redemption. To the 
degree that Buddhism shares these features, which are appropriate 
given its primary goal of spiritual liberation, it is insufficient by 
itself to resolve structural social-political crises to the degree that 
these require critical and empirically-oriented social research and 
transformation. Like other ethical and religious ideals, Buddhism 
can become a constituent part of social ills, if the Buddhist does 
not recognize the independent and plural structural qualities of 
social-political life. Nonetheless, despite these limits, it still offers 
a valuable response to the question. Because of its responsiveness 
to the suffering of others as well as its self-critical, non-coercive 
and egalitarian character, Buddhism provides a powerful and 
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cogent individual way of life. And, as such, it can contribute to the 
resolution of conflict and suffering. 
The conclusion that Buddhism is not the primary cause of the 
Sri Lankan conflict and can be part of its peaceful resolution is not 
a new thesis. P. D. Premasiri reasonably concludes that there is no 
place for righteous war within Pāli Buddhism: “the idea of a just or 
righteous war (dharma yuddha) involving the use of weapons of 
war and violence is conspicuously absent in the Buddhist canon. 
The Buddha countered the prevailing belief that soldiers of war 
who fight for a cause could, as a consequence of their rightful 
performance of duty, aspire to attain a heavenly rebirth if they 
succumb to their injuries while in combat. The Buddha states in the 
Pāli canon that one who fights a war does not generate wholesome 
thoughts but thoughts of malice and hatred, which are absolutely 
unwholesome. Therefore, their future destiny will be a woeful one, 
which is in accordance with their unwholesome kamma.”85 
According to my argument, Buddhism shares some of the 
potential problems of other varieties of virtue ethics. In particular, 
(1) moral appropriateness and skillfulness can become a potentially 
dangerous doctrine legitimating unethical behavior and (2) the 
ethics of individual self-cultivation of character can become 
ideologically complicit with systems of exploitation and 
domination. First, skillfulness can be reduced to an instrumental 
manipulation of means without regard for the quality of the ends, 
such that it is removed from its ethical context of loving-kindness, 
generosity, compassion, and ahisā. Second, the privatization of 
the ethical separates questions of character from the reproduction 
of social-political systems, such that the moralist as well as the 
ideologue appeals to the good intentions of individuals without 
regard for underlying relations of power. Socially engaged 
Buddhists ought to be mindful of both issues if they are to counter 
the potential betrayal of the moral core of the Dhamma through 
individual practices and social-political institutions. These 
possibilities cannot be excluded a priori and indicate the need to 
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be vigilant in cultivating and practicing the art of ethical 
appropriateness and skillfulness. 
Like other forms of context-sensitive ethics, Buddhist ethics 
cannot be reduced to the mechanical application of one principle or 
universal rule, such as John Stuart Mill’s principle of utility or 
Kant’s categorical imperative. Whereas rule-based ethics requires 
the appeal to and application of a general principle to particulars, 
context-based ethics appeals to a concrete and existential way of 
living as a whole. This whole involves the interdependence of self 
and others as well as self and world.86 In this context, even the first 
and most basic precepts of non-harm and non-violence (ahisā) 
cannot be taken as unconditional or absolute if they cause more 
harm than not. This is why the taking of life in conflict or war is 
discouraged, especially because of their negative motivations and 
consequences, yet not absolutely forbidden in Pāli and Sri Lankan 
Buddhism. Likewise, vegetarianism is not taken as an absolute in 
the Pāli canon or in Theravāda countries. The Buddha rejected 
making it an unconditional duty or obligation, as one is more or 
less culpable for eating meat or even killing an animal given (1) 
the sentience/insentience of the being killed, (2) the motivation or 
intention involved in killing the animal (e.g., hunting for food as 
opposed to killing for employment or sport), (3) the amount of 
suffering produced by the action, and (4) the directness and 
indirectness of one’s involvement in the killing of the animal.87 
Instead of being an absolute independently existing command 
or obligation, morality is seen as a conditional and dependently 
arisen ethical mode of comportment. It is a situational and 
responsive disposition from which one can ethically respond to the 
diversity of concrete circumstances. Without this ethical 
orientation and context, a decontextualized notion of skillfulness – 
and appropriate judgment in general – can and has been used to 
justify violence and war in ways that run contrary to the Buddha’s 
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teachings. If my argument is valid, then moral skillfulness and 
appropriateness can legitimately be used to justify less morally 
problematic and culpable forms of violence such as self-defense 
and perhaps humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide. As a 
consequence, it provides a limited and conditional Buddhist just-
war-theory such that Theravāda countries can legitimately have 
armies and police forces and still be considered Buddhist. Yet, 
these uses are circumscribed, and such reasoning cannot 
consistently be used to justify aggressive violence or war 
motivated by anger, craving, hatred, or attachment. From this 
perspective, there is much to criticize in these lands and their 
history. Nonetheless, if the realization of Dhamma right here in 
this life is not to be completely betrayed by worldly calculations, 
then even such a pragmatically reasonable position goes too far or 
risks too much. Despite actual and potential problems with 
Buddhists, who would like but have not yet realized the Dhamma, 
it remains a commendable virtue of Buddhism that it provides the 
means to rigorously question violence and war as well as 
demanding the proper cultivation of the skillfulness and insight to 
do so. Such insight means that one is not only attentive to what 
others do but more importantly to one’s own activities and 
disposition, even more when one has the self-satisfaction of it 
seeming most sensible and decent. 
